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18 1. INTRODUCTION 
A series of recent incidents have highlighted the dangers to relief workers of working in 
conflict zones  and other insecure  environments.  Kidnappings,  abductions  and targeted 
attacks  have  become  disturbingly  regular  in  places  such  as  Bosnia,  Rwanda,  Congo, 
Somalia, Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus, and Tajikistan. 
This phenomenon has complex roots and wide implications. 
In view of this, the Commission has thought it fit to present the following working paper 
outlining its analysis of the problem and policy recommendations. Needless to  say, this 
will not be the last word on the subject, but it is hoped that the paper is a timely one and 
can lead to action in various quarters. 
The paper is based on work done by ECHO over the past nine months, which finds fuller 
expression in a more detailed working paper which is available on request and provides 
a  fuller  background  to  its  recommendations.  That  paper  stands  as  a  useful  reference 
document for all those seeking to think through the problem in order to draw conclusions 
and to gain inspiration on issues which are not directly tackled here. It has been the object 
of a  nine-month  consultation  process  with  a  wide  range  of interested  parties  and 
organisations, and its reception has so far been very positive. 
Insecurity gives rise to  moral dilemmas for agencies1, and when atrocities do occur there 
is a widespread sense of public outrage. In addition to this, even when it is not hitting the 
headlines, insecurity carries significant costs for agencies and,  by extension, for donors 
and for the quality of the international relief effort. Incidents may give rise to  important 
financial and non-financial costs at the agency level, especially in terms of staff morale 
and agency reputation. Fatalities may also lead to  such public outcry that they call  into 
question the  whole  future  of an  agency's programme in  a  given country,  or even the 
whole future of  aid to that country at all.  Those in need are then the first to suffer. 
Self-interest,  professional  ethics  and  wider  moral  considerations  therefore  make  it 
incumbent  on  all  concerned  to  assume  responsibility  for  the  problem  and  to  take  it 
seriously. 
Sensitivity to  casualties amongst relief workers, as well as  to  the wider implications of 
such incidents,  is  not new,  but it  has  been evident in much recent discussion amongst 
both agencies and donors.  For example,  the  final  communique of the  G-8  at the June 
1997  summit in Denver expressed in  §65  "grave concern at  the  recent attacks  against 
refugees  as  well  as  against personnel  of refugee  and  humanitarian  organisations".  EU 
Member States were  also  instrumental  recently  in  gaining acceptance  for  UN  General 
Assembly Resolution 521167 on safety and security of humanitarian personnel. 
1 The term  ·agencies' is  used throughout this paper in  a generic sense to  refer to  UN agencies, the Red 
Cross movement, and NGOs, insofar as any of  these is  involved in humanitarian work. It is quite clearly not enough just to ask how relief workers and supplies can be protected 
where  they are  deployed:  it  is  increasingly also  a  question of determining if and how 
security conditions can  be  created which  allow relief to  be  deployed at all.  To  put it 
another way, the problem is not just "humanitarian" but also political. 
Nonetheless, the issue of insecurity has not yet been the object of systematic enquiry. A 
conceptual  understanding  of the  problem  is  vital  to  clarify  the  options  available  and 
choices to be made. 
2. ])lEFINITIONS AND SCOPE 
A few definitions must be spclt out in order to clarify the scope of  the paper. 
It  focuses  on  a  limited  definition  of security:  arrangements  aimed  at  avoiding  or 
countering threats of the use of  violence against the physical and emotional integrity of 
relief workers. 
This is not intended to be an operational definition for agencies. The purpose is simply to 
focus  in on those  aspects of security which arc most closely linked to  the  problem of 
access and humanitarian space, and to explore these wider implications. 
It is  far from easy to define a "relief wor}{Cr"2.  At field level, most organisations have 
multiple mandates and varying self-definitions. There is also often a temptation to stretch 
the  term "humanitarian", particularly because it  offers a fast  track to  induce donors to 
mobilise aid more quickly.  Within the EU, definitions also vary considerably. One may 
reasonably take as a starting-point, however, that while operations may be  humanitarian 
in their objectives or in their means of implementation; agencies as such arc not (the only 
exception being ICRC,  which  is  "humanitarian" by  definition).  To  a  greater or lesser 
degree  all  are  involved  at  some  time  or other  in  activities  which  go  beyond  a  strict 
definition of humanitarian action. The definition of who is  a relief worker is,  however, 
not central to the arguments to be developed here3. 
The scope is  not  limited to  expatriate agency staff. Whilst they may  be  more  in  the 
public limelight, they are still only one link in the chain of all those involved in the relief 
effort,  and  it  would  be  difficult  both ethically and  in  practice  to  single  them out for 
special treatment. Most if not all agencies would be just as concerned for their contracted 
local staff as  for expatriate staff. There are also staff involved in  supporting operations 
but  not  under  contract,  local  agencies  which  may  sometimes  be  subcontracted  by 
international agencies, the staff of local facilities such as hospitals which arc vital to  the 
relief effort,  and  other local  people just trying  to  help  - right  down to  those  in  need 
themselves, not simply object but subject of the whole process. All of these groups may 
2 The terms "relief' and "humanitarian" are used interchangeably in this paper. 
3  A  number of the  arguments developed  in  the  paper may,  of course,  also  be  applicable also  to  other 
expatriate and local staff than relief workers, who may also face  high levels of risk in  the course of 
their duties  · 
2 at one time or another find themselves in danger because of or despite their humanitarian 
activities. 
The difficulty of  delimiting the group with which we are concerned is,  in fact,  at the heart 
of  the  question. It is  both impossible and counterproductive to  focus  exclusively on the 
security of expatriate and local relief workers without reference to the other links in the 
chain.  The security dilemma of relief workers melts,  in fact,  into the whole notion of 
humanitarian space. Apart from anything else, incidents involving relief workers reflect 
increasing difficulties in providing aid to those in need at all. As such, they are part of a 
worrying trend which calls for a global solution. 
The  term  "humanitarian  space"  has  come  into  widespread  recent  use  without 
agreement  as  to  its  precise  definition.  The  origins  of the  term  lie  in  the  idea  of a 
consensual space for humanitarian actors to  do  their work.  Until  recently, the fact  that 
physical security is an intrinsic and necessary part of  humanitarian space has tended to 
be downplayed. It is becoming increasingly clear that this needs to change. 
Both general measures (at the  level of the  security environment) and specific ones (in 
support of actual  relief operations)  can  be  used  to  underpin  physical  security.  These 
measures are usually (and preferably) not military, although the military can be called 
upon if necessary. Nor are they the sole responsibility of  actors external to humanitarian 
agencies. 
The concept of humanitarian space covers both the security of workers and of those in 
need. Since the role of  workers is, of course, to sustain those in need, the limited focus of 
this  paper on their security  is  to  be  seen as  one  part of the  wider debate  on how to 
establish safe humanitarian space, and it is certainly not the whole picture. 
3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEl\1 
3.1  The extent of insecurity: a fe\v statistics 
Prior to  1992, it has been claimed that security was "not a major issue" for the UN, that 
"UN  policy  was  that  staff  and  dependents  should  not  be  exposed  to  dangerous 
situations",  and  that "it was almost unheard of for  a staff member to  be  killed".  This 
contrasts  with  statements  by  UNHCR  in  1997  to  the  effect  that  the  humanitarian 
imperative is overriding and that only severe casualties would force withdrawal. 
There are no exact statistics on casualties amongst aid workers, but, in any case, fatalities 
from  violent  attack  are  only  the  tip  of the  iceberg.  The  problems  associated  with 
insecurity go much wider. 
Agencies are increasingly concerned with insecurity-related stress. The survey Room for 
Improve.ment noted that personal security was a major source of stress for expatriate field 
3 staff working in dangerous situations. Only 6% of those interviewed - which included 
development workers- recorded no security problems at their work location4• 
In June  1997, the UN considered 53  countries to be insecure to some degree; 28 were 
considered wholly or partially to be at "phase three" or above, requiring relocation of all 
non-essential staff and all dependents. UNHCR calculates that, around the same date, it 
had over 3.000 staff working in areas designated insecure; around  10.000 if associated 
NGOs are added into the equation. By all acounts, the working environment of UNHCR 
staff has "altered dramatically" over the last five years. 
The number of people in need who may have died because it was impossible to provide 
aid on account of  the security situation is inestimable. 
The available evidence offers little doubt that insecurity is a serious and growing problem 
of humanitarian action, that at its current level it is of recent origin, and that there is at 
present  no  sign of this  trend  being  fundamentally  reversed.  In order to  establish  the 
reasons foe this and to predict future trends, we need to take a look at causes. 
3.2  Causes 
Much evidence relates increased risk to a number of factors which characterise present-
day conflicts: the economic value of relief, its impact upon the dynamics of conflict, the 
political capital which aggressions against relief workers may occasionally attract,  the 
scope  to  obtain  significant  ransom  money,  and  the  intrinsically  anti-humanitarian 
character of the war goals of parties to internal conflict. In short, on this view it is the 
nature of  contemporary conflict itself  which lies at the root of  the problem. 
But we can also come at the problem from another angle. For the sake of  argument, let us 
assume,  simplistically  but  not  unreasonably,  that  any  single  agency,  left  to  its  own 
devices, would have a view (even if not explicitly) as to what is an "acceptable" level of 
risk to  staff.  It would then act  to  maintain exposure to  risk constant by expanding or 
reducing  activities  in  function  of the  situation  on  the  ground.  If this  is  true,  but 
proportionately  more  casualties  are  nonetheless  occurring,  then  it  may  well  be  that 
incentives to take risk arc provided by the "market". On the agency side, competition for 
funding contributes to  willingness to take risk, while, on the donor side, the need to do 
"something"  in  hostile  crisis  environments  means  that  funds  may  be  on  offer  for 
operations which are  next to  impossible to carry out.  In other words,  both donor and 
agency funding behaviour can give rise to risk. 
This model may be simplistic, but it does capture something of what is going on; it also 
accounts for the clear tendency on the part of many agencies, and indeed quite a number 
of donors,  to  try  to  "regulate" the humanitarian sector through initiatives  such as  the 
IFRC!NGO code of conduct and the People in Aid Code, even if  security as such has not 
so far been a central feature of  these efforts. 
4 R.  Macnair ( 1995), ODI RRN Network Paper n°  10, Overseas Development Institute, London 
4 It needs to be carefully noted, however, that the above causes give rise only to risk,  not to 
incidents as such. The probability that risks will lead to security incidents and casualties 
depends also on how workers and agencies deal with it.  Many practical measures could 
and  should be  implemented to  improve  staff safety  and  thereby  expand humanitarian 
space. In practice, incident upon incident has shown the extent to which, at the agency 
level, these are too often neglected, sometimes with dramatic consequences. Inter-agency 
cooperation too leaves much to be desired. 
The analysis of cause and effect from the angle of risk avoidance needs to bear in mind 
that agency practice impacts upon security in two  ways.  Technical security  guidelines 
and  procedures  may  diminish  the  likelihood  that  a  given  risk  will  translate  into  an 
incident, or the  gravity of any  incidents which do  occur:  ex-past risk avoidance. They 
may  also  diminish  the  likelihood  of a  risk  arising  in  the  first  place:  ex-ante  risk 
avoidance.  General  agency  practice  - the  standards  that.  agencies  work  to,  the 
relationships they have with parties on the ground and so forth- also contributes to  ex-
ante risk avoidance. 
3.3  Types of risk 
It is  also  important to  make a distinction between different kinds of risk in order to 
differentiate appropriate responses. 
For present purposes, a four-fold distinction is proposed: accident, criminality, banditry 
and targetings. 
Accident refers to being caught in crossfire, being in the wrong place at the wrong time, 
falling victim to landmines, or aviation and road accidents and the like. 
Criminality is  largely  self-explanatory.  Banditry refers  to  armed  factions  seeking to 
plunder aid agency assets with an economic value in order to feed their war machine or 
for personal gain. It is also a risk in post-conflict settings where small arms remain freely 
available and alternative means of  earning income are in short supply. Hostage-taking for 
ransom (a particular problem in the Northern Caucasus for  example) also  comes under 
this heading. 
Lastly,  targeting refers to  deliberate attacks or threats aimed at an agency in  order to 
disrupt its activities or to  influence the  behaviour of third  party,  mainly  international, 
actors,  either  to  withdraw  or,  on  the  contrary,  intervene  more  forcefully.  Such 
motivations for attacks on relief workers have characterised operations in,  for example, 
Bosnia, Somalia, and the Great Lakes. 
In  order to  determine  priorities  for  remedial  strategies,  one  might want to  know  the 
proportion of incidents falling into each category. Unfortunately, no  statistical evidence 
is  presently available.  Anecdotal evidence  suggests,  however,  that  the  criminality and 
banditry categories predominate. _It  would also appear that relatively simple precautions 
5 This partly follows ICRC's practice. 
5 would have been sufficient to prevent a number of the casualties which have occurred in 
these categories. 
4. A  CONCEPTUAL  FRAlVIEWORK  FOR 
TACI<LING INSECURITY 
4.1  Addressing the causes of insecurity 
It follows  from the discussion on "causes" above that in addressing insecurity there are 
·three possible avenues, namely: 
•  deterring or minimising abusive practice in war; 
•  donor funding behaviour; 
•  and agency practice. 
Deterring or minimising abusive practice  in war may  be  approached  in  either of two 
ways:  one  may seek to  modify the  behaviour of belligerents,  or,  less  ambitiously,  to 
reduce the material scope for abuse. 
In order to modify the behaviour of belligerents, "soft" measures are unlikely to suffice. 
Belligerents' motivations for acting as they do are too strong, and form an integral part of 
their reasons for being in conflict at all. Measures such· as dissemination of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) in peacetime, and especially making it subject to the jurisdiction 
of  an  international  criminal  court  as  will  be  discussed  shortly  at  the  diplomatic 
conference in Rome, certainly deserve support. However, this should not blind us to the 
fact that, in most cases, human rights abuses in internal conflict can only effectively be 
deterred through a form of coercion which either strikes directly at the war aims of the 
abusing  parties  or  renders  abuse  materially  much  more  difficult.  An example  of the 
former might be withholding the prospect of recognition or cutting off trade;  the latter 
may  involve  the  use  of armed  protection  (which  is,  however,  often  flawed)  or more 
massive military deployment. 
The fact  that the  trend  towards  internal  conflict  is  likely  to  be  an enduring  feature  of 
future  humanitarian  work  only  makes  it  all  the  more  imperative  to  look  for  new 
approaches to the problems and dilemmas posed by insecurity. 
An alternative strategy is  reducing the material scope for abuse. Through appropriate 
means, belligerents can be given less incentive to engage in abuses not through the threat 
of sanction, but simply because the economic, political or military value of relief goods 
and  personnel  is  kept  to  a  minimum.  The  extensive  use  of  local  capacities  is  a 
cornerstone in this approach. 
This  distinction  gives  rise  to  four  subheadings  under  which  recommendations  can be 
broken down.  Clearly,  action under each of these  headings  is  complementary and  the 
most effective choice of strategy depends on the situation being confronted. 
6 4.2  The relationship benveen causes and typology 
The following table shows the relationship between the causes of risk and the proposed 
typology, and may help to guide the choice of  measures in individual situations or at the 
global level. 
This  table  shows  that  agency  practice  is  relevant  to  reducing  all  kinds  of risk, 
Accident  Criminality  Banditry  Targetting 
Change belligerent 
(X)  X 
behaviour 
Reduce material 
X  X  X 
scope for abuse 
Adapt donor 
(X)  (X)  X  X 
funding practice 
Influence agency 
X  X  (X)  X 
practice 
although  it  is  least effective against banditry. In situations of banditry,  the  primary 
focus  must  be  on  reducing the  material scope for abuse.  This  is  also  an  effective 
strategy against all  categories of  risk except accident. 
Donor funding practice might, conceivably, also discourage agencies from investing in 
measures  to  counter accidents  and  criminality,  but  the  major  concern  is  that  it  may 
encourage  them  to  expose  themselves  to  banditry  and  targetting  beyond  the  risk 
threshold which the situation and their readiness to confront it should imply. 
Insofar as  targetting is  more premeditated and a  more specific threat,  it  may be  more 
amenable to  efforts aimed at  influencing belligerent behaviour through incitation or 
coercion.  This stwtcgy runs  up  against greater problems in situations of banditry, for 
two  reasons.  In  a  number of cases,  interlocutors  are  difficult  to  identify,  hierarchical 
discipline is  low, or groups are less amenable to  pressure on account of their small size. 
Where banditry serves war aims or is  tied up with the way the war economy works,  it 
may  be  possible  to  identify  interlocutors  but  not to  give  them  sufficient  incentive  to 
change their behaviour. 
7 5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This  last  section  puts  forward  a  number  of recommendations  together  with  some 
comments justifying them. The basis for these recommendations is  treated in much more 
depth in the working paper. 
5.1  General recommendations 
•  Move security issues up the agenda of agencies and donors 
Although it is receiving increasing attention, security is a long way from dominating the 
agendas of either agencies or donors. It needs to  receive high-level backing and become 
an integrated part of planning. 
Donors  must therefore  deliberately  place  much more  emphasis  on  security  issues.  In 
doing  so,  they  should  project  an  holistic  concept  of  security,  not  limited  to 
technical/procedural aspects but encompassing how agencies operate on the ground, the 
wider question of humanitarian space, and donors' own policy mechanisms and stances. 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  cite  adherence  to  principles  or  relationships  with  the  local 
community as  an adequate guarantee of agency security: these are  important elements, 
but they are not the whole picture and they may disguise a reluctance to  think the issues 
through. 
•  Keep the security situation under review 
Donors should not rely solely on agency or UN assessments of the security situation in 
the field, since either of these sources of information may suffer from serious drawbacks. 
Those  donors  which  have  .the  capacity  should  also  monitor  the  security  situation 
themselves, in order to arrive at informed funding decisions, where necessary, to adopt a 
common stance, and to  plan for possible contigencies. Donor security officers could be 
deployed to the  field,  with responsibility also to  advise and report on agency and inter-
agency security arrangements. 
•  Sponsor further research 
The anecdotal  character of much of the  evidence  is  in  itself proof of failure  to  take 
security seriously. Primary research into the problem of insecurity is lacking, and should 
be stimulated. Analysis of the typology, causes and dimensions of the problem should be 
allied with applied research into the effectiveness of different strategies to deal with it. 
8 5.2  Influencing agency practice 
•  Encourage good practice and be prepared to fund security 
Good security costs money, and, although in the long run it more than pays for itself, it is 
easily crowded out in an excessively competitive environment. Donors therefore need to 
be prepared to fund security measures. 
There is already some willingness to  fund operational security, but there arc weaknesses 
at  the  conceptual  level  and  there  is  a  lack of expertise  available  to  tr.e  humanitarian 
community. Donor funding should therefore as a priority be dire.cted towards supporting 
an agency's general security planning, training agency staff in security (preferably on 
an interagency basis), and developing agency/interagency capacity on both technical and 
more general security issues. 
•  Require ·a high standard of  security from agencies 
By and large, agency practice in respect of security leaves a lot to be desired. As well as 
being prepared to  fund security measures, donors need, progressively at least, to require 
them from  agencies so  as  to  eliminate any  incentive to  cut costs  by  limiting  security 
expenditure. 
All  donors should request that agencies  in  their proposals  and  reports  demonstrate an 
assessment  and  monitoring  of the  security  situation,  and  require  them  to  make 
systematic  enquiries into  security incidents:  the  way they  responded to  them and  the 
lessons to be learnt. Donors should request that the  results of such enquiries be shared 
with  them,  and,  in  particular  insofar  as  it  is  a  question  of accumulating  insight  into 
specific situations in a given theatre, also with other agencies. 
Agencies should be  required to  have adequate operational  security guidelines, and to 
have a clear commitment to training and briefing staff. Common sense principles such 
as insisting that inexperienced staff arc not 'thrown in at the deep end' must be demanded 
by  donors.  Minimum  field  equipment  standards  (such  as  two-way  radios)  arc  also 
essential. 
It is  wrong  to  assume that donor guidelines  in  this  area would  be  unwelcome.  Many 
agencies do indeed say that they would support donor efforts to ensure minimum agency 
standards. Preference to agencies committed to implementing the People in Aid code is a 
possible immediate step which is  also justified on other grounds6. In the longer term, the 
code  might  be  built  upon  to  reinforce  its  security  dimension,  preferably  by  NGOs 
themselves. It is strongly recommended that security measures also apply to local agency 
staff. 
6  The  People  in  Aid  Code  of Best  Practice  in  the  Management  and  Support  of Aid  Personnel  was 
published as  ODI RRN Network Paper n° 20, Feb.  1997. It is a joint effort to develop practical guidelines 
amongst agencies committed to  high standards in  human resource management, and includes reference to 
the issue of  security. 
9 When carrying out evaluations, whether ex-ante or ex-post, donors should also  ensure 
that  security  arrangements  in  the  broad  sense  form  part  of their  terms  of reference. 
Specific evaluations focussing on security could also be carried out. 
•  Require a high standard of professional ethics and standards 
Professional  ethics  and  a clear understanding  and implementation of the  humanitarian 
mandate contribute significantly to  agency security,  but this  factor  may also  easily  be 
undermined if there are a number of agencies on the ground who do not conform to  such 
standards. The importance of humanitarian principles underlines the need,  however, to 
formulate and interpret them in such a way as to provide guidelines which fit the reality 
of contemporary internal conflict. 
Donors need to adopt rigorous requirements for the agencies which they fund, including 
requiring them to  have  a demonstrable commitment to  standards.  They should also  be 
prepared to  sanction agencies whose performance is  not up  to  scratch by  withdrawing 
funding. Concerted donor effort of this kind could also contribute to reversing the much-
criticised proliferation of  agencies in recent crises. 
•  Strengthen inter-agency capacity 
Action confined to the level of individual agencies is unlikely to be sufficient to deal with 
systemic and situational aspects of security.  Umbrella organisations must therefore take 
on a responsibility for  developing  or disseminating standards, tools,  guidelines and  so 
forth.  (As argued below, a "focal agency" model may be more appropriate in the  field). 
The efforts already undertaken by the US-based NGO consortium InterAction in the area 
of training are an encouraging sign. Donors have an important role to play in stimulating 
this process. 
•  Review UN arrangements 
There is a particular need to review security arrangements within the UN, especially with 
reference  to  the role  of the  UN  Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD).  The system  is 
being overwhelmed by the scope of current challenges: it suffers from limited resources, 
bureaucratic constraints, and a lack of  specificity and operational insight. 
Such a review has now been called for in the framework of UNGA Resolution 52/45 as 
well as by the UNHCR Staff-Management Committee. Donor governments should make 
an  active  input into  this  process.  The review should examine all· options which might 
improve security both for  UN and non-UN humanitarian workers.  Some services might 
be provided by or through OCHA (the successor to DHA) or a lead UN field agency, and 
integrated  with  other  field  support/logistic  functions  such  as  staff  and  resource 
management,  information  exchange  and  the  deployment  of specialist  assessment  and 
support teams in overall coordination schemes. 
10 •  Support an integrated approach to field security 
There is a clear need to  group security information relating to a given crisis together in 
one place where security professionals can usc it for planning purposes and where it  is 
interpreted  and  made  accessible  to  the  whole  humanitarian  community.  Authoritative 
information is of vital importance to agencies in deciding courses of action in the face of 
risk,  and  all  the  more  so  in  those  many  situations  where  rumour  or  deliberate 
misinformation  may  abound.  Collection  of  all  available  information  is  of  vital 
importance to  planners, so  that statistically significant trends can be distinguished in a 
minimum  of  time  from  random  occurrences.  Such  information  also  needs  to  be 
standardised, suggesting moves towards a common reporting system, based at field level 
but passed up to a central database available for trend analysis. 
Security planning is presently, more often than not, lamentable. The chaos in Brazzaville 
when  agencies  evacuated  from  Kinshasa  with  the  imminent  fall  of Mobutu,  and  the 
· general unawareness of security plans which has been reported by the UN in the  Great 
Lakes, arc not extreme but in fact rather typical examples. 
The model of a technical "field security centre" for  information and planning deserves 
serious consideration. Such a centre should come under the guidance of a lead NGO or 
UN agency and its staff should include security professionals. The approach followed by 
such a centre should be comparable from one crisis to another and should therefore be 
subject to the interagency coordination referred to above. 
5.3  Needed changes to donor aid and cooperation policy 
•  Emphasise conflict prevention and mitigation 
It goes without saying that the best way of reducing security risks to  aid workers is  by 
preventing, mitigating and resolving conflict. This paper does not need to rehearse the 
ways in which this might be done, but it can hardly avoid underlining this fundamental 
point.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  recent  Carnegie  Commission report  will  serve  as  a 
platform for this issue finally to receive comprehensive treatment at international leveJ7. 
Before and during conflict, it is  necessary to  limit the flow of am1s  into conflict-prone 
areas. Donor governments need also to show an understanding of the economic dynamics 
of war and a concerted willingness to  starve rather than feed  the war machine through 
their aid and trade policies. 
The way agencies go about programming aid may also have  a considerable impact on 
conflict dynamics. This impact may be  positive, but all  too  often it is  not,  and donors 
cannot avoid the need to review proposed agency operations from this perspectives. 
7  Ref.  the  Commission's Communication  on  Preventing  Conflict  in  Africa SEC(96)332  and  the  work 
carried out within the Conflict Prevention Network 
8 The issue is  reviewed in  detail in  John Prendergast's 1996 book Frontline Diplomacy: humanitarian aid 
and conflict in Africa. 
11 •  Stick to global principles for donor humanitarian funding 
Donors are ultimately responsible for determining the pattern of aid in any given context, 
which in turn largely determines the perception that belligerents have of humanitarian aid 
being balanced and principled. Donors too, therefore, need to abide by certain principles. 
However, while those principles should certainly be inspired by agency principles and the 
humanitarian tradition, it does not necessarily follow that they should or can simply be 
agency principles writ large. 
Wherever possible,~donor humanitarian aid should at least aim at being globally impartial 
and non-discriminatory. Perceptions of imbalance or suspicion of ulterior motives often 
have immediate knock-on effects for agencies on the  ground. Agencies may indeed be 
operationally independent - and this should be respected - but financially they depend 
upon donor choices and therefore "inherit" some of  their image from donors. 
There  may,  however,  be many  reasons  why  a  policy of global  impartiality  and  non-
discrimimtion, even if it remains as a point of reference, cannot be followed through on 
the ground. If this is the case, it is  strongly urged that policy nonetheless be explicit and 
reasoned, coordinated amongst donors, and systematically implemented. Most crucially, 
the  security  implications  of donor  policy  need  to  be  seriously  assessed,  so  as  to 
programme aid in such a way that it minimises the risks associated with policy which - at 
the global level, de facto, and for whatever reason- favours one side over another. 
•  Eliminate incentives to take unnecessary risk 
A  consequence of demanding  a  high  standard  of security  preparation  from  agencies 
should be a determination on the part of the donor community to  eliminate incentives for 
agencies to  take unnecessary risk.  Claims to  be able to  go where other agencies do  not 
dare should mostly be  treated with suspicion, and  being the  last  to  leave  a  dangerous 
situation should more often be  penalised than rewarded.  A  responsible attitude to  risk 
should be rewarded by better chances to receive funding. 
Donors should also do what they can to avoid giving agencies incentives to bid for large 
contracts  without  necessarily  having  done  the  proper  preparatory  work,  including  in 
terms of security.  A  specific measure which might be  useful  in this  regard  is  to  allow 
seed  funding  to  support  agencies  in  a  preliminary  analysis  and  relationship  building 
phase prior to designing and implementing a major project or programme. 
•  Choose agencies in function of the situation 
The risk associated \Vith  different agencies may well  be  quite different, and a judicious 
choice of partners can minimise risk. factors which enter into consideration are: political 
associations accruing to the UN or to agencies of a particular nationality; whether or not 
it  is  desirable  to  have  the  same  agency  operating  on  both  sides  of a  conflict;  other 
activities that the same agency may be involved in; the agency's commitment to security, 
as  well  as  its  general  humanitarian  aid  experience  and  standards;  willingness  to 
coordinate with others; and style of work (discrete or outspoken). 
12 It is  important that donors  equip themselves  to  analyse  and understand agency track-
records under these headings, and that they pool such knowledge amongst themselves  . 
..,  Encourage a "focal agency" model for security in the field 
The  fragmentation  of security  information,  know-how  and  planning  is  to  no-one's 
advantage. However, security is closely linked to operations; it is not likely that umbrella 
organisations,  due  to  their non-operational  character,  are  in  a  position to assume  this 
function in a given field situation. A "focal agency" model is more attractive. 
While donors would probably not want to try to appoint specific agencies to assume this 
function,  this model can be  fostered by  (i)  building up  key skills in  a small number of 
agencies rather than fragmenting knowledge across the agency spectrum; (ii) insisting as 
a  consequence  that  these  skills  are  put  at  the  disposal  of the  wider  humanitarian 
community and (iii) asking agencies to indicate in their proposals the agency appointed 
to act as a focal point for coordinating security arrangements. 
This paper is agnostic as to whether these capacities are best built up in the UN, NGOs or 
elsewhere, provided that the above conditions are respected. Particularly, however, ifthe 
UN  is  chosen,  the  option of making buying in  to  the  arrangements  compulsory under 
certain  conditions  could  also  be  entertained;  a  genuinely  coordinated  system  may 
sometimes  be  at  that  price.  It is,  in this  context,  worth noting  UNHCR's  work on a 
generic  agreement with NGOs  which  would  include  a  commitment to  work out  and 
implement joint security plans,  adhere  to  certain behavioural  norms,  and  respond  in  a 
coordinated way to incidents. 
With or without a  clear lead agency,  field-level  coordination is  absolutely vital  and  it 
needs to  be  stepped up.  Donors should therefore consider exercising pressure on their 
grant recipients to participate in effective collaborative arrangements with other agencies, 
and  withholding  funding  from  agencies  operating  in  too  independent  a  way  without 
convmcmg reasons. 
•  Be sensitive to the implications ofvisibility 
Donors need to  be sensitive to legitimate arguments from agencies if the latter feel that a 
given form of donor visibility may be  detrimental to  their perceived independence and 
hence  security  in  the  field.  They  need  also  to  be  aware  that  proxy  symbols  of 
humanitarianism may easily be  misused and thus  lose their currency in  theatre·- even 
gain negative associations. 
•  Allow  agencies  flexibility  to  cope  with  changing  security  conditions  on  the 
ground 
Some  kinds of over-stringent and  inflexible  funding  arrangements  with  agencies  may 
provide them with incentives to persist in operations of a type which the evolution of the 
security situation has rendered inappropriate. Flexibility in such arrangements is therefore 
essential, at least in regard to aspects which are closely linked to security. These include 
areas of work, types of relief supplied (e.g.  changing from more to less lootable items), 
delivery arrangements, and specific security-related expenditure. A further practical issue 
13 is  the  need  to  allow  staff and  support  costs  to  continue  to  be  paid  m  the  event  of 
temporary evacuations becoming necessary. 
The need to  build such flexibility into donor-agency relations is  an additional argument 
for enhanced donor presence in the field. 
•  Mobilise non-military support to the security environment 
New instruments for intervention, in order to eliminate specific security threats, need to 
be  developed.  Armed groups  in  refugee  camps  are  a notorious  example.  The  security 
threat is much more diffuse in complex emergencies than it is in classical armed warfare. 
For this  reason,  non-military  resources - police and  special  forces,  and  private  sector 
expertise- need to be mobilised more than they are at present to give advice and·draw up 
plans.  This also applies in many post-conflict settings where residual violence remains a 
problem.  Police operations  have  the  added  advantage of far  lower unit costs than the 
military. 
The means to  mobilise  police  contingents  and the  arrangements  which apply  to  them 
urgently  need  further consideration.  Police operations have  been criticised for  fielding 
staff without adequate training or understanding of the local environment, and for being 
poorly structured and/or managed. Work within WEU on contingency planning for police 
operations  may  have  a  particula~ value  for  the  response  capacity  of the  international 
community to the problems of  present-day humanitarian action. 
•  Assume a greater responsibility for aid worker safety 
Donors  might contribute directly to  improved aid worker safety,  inter  alia by  sharing 
information  with  agencies,  coordinating  on  security  issues,  offering  guarantees  to 
expatriate and  local staff (including evacuation for  local staff if it becomes necessary), 
and being prepared to  deploy rapid military backup for evacuations if necessary. Under 
certain circumstances they  might sponsor the  direct  deployment of a  civilian  security 
mechanism in the field. 
Several agencies have expressed a good deal of interest in accessing donor information, 
such as political and technical reports and satellite imagery, including information which 
is  not  restricted but simply not made  available  systematically, predictably,  sufficiently 
rapidly or in  a usable form.  Discussions to  this effect could be entered into, aiming at 
framework agreements, notably with the UN agencies. 
•  Ensure  overall  foreign  policy  rs  consistent  with  and  supports  humanitarian 
objectives. 
Overall  policy  need  not be  impartial,  but it should be  motivated by considerations of 
fairness, justice and  encouraging reconciliation and sustainable peace.  If it  is  pursuing 
other  objectives  which  are  in  fundamental  opposition  to  these,  humanitarian 
organisations have a moral right to  know so that their decision to  accept the risk which 
relief work entails is at least the result of  a conscious choice. 
14 There are many ways in. which foreign policy instruments such as diplomatic alliances, 
commercial  relations,  loans,  international  recognition,  economic  sanctions,  visa 
restrictions  and  so  forth  could  be  brought  to  bear  to  support  humanitarian  space. 
Persisting in considering humanitarian aid as an activity apart, or one which only surfaces 
on foreign policy agendas when dramatic events occur, denies the opportunity to exploit 
these instruments. It is not a "politicisation" of humanitarian aid to conceive of it within 
an  overall  foreign  policy  framework,  it  is  a  logical  consequence  of its  being  worth 
providing at all. 
•  Uphold an ethic of humanitarianism and establish a  partnership with agencies 
which encompasses human rights 
While it is important to maintain humanitarian identity and principles, there is an urgent 
need to  reinterpret the humanitarian mandate both theoretically and operationally if it  is 
to  retain  its  credibility  and  moral  force,  in  particular  by  insisting  on  the  protection 
component of humanitarian work and by integrating certain human rights notions within 
the conceptual framework that agencies and donors project. 
Failure to  do  so during recent operations such as the one in Eastern Congo predictably 
turned  out to  be  venturing  down a  blind alley.  The  presence of aid  agencies  on that 
occasion all too often meant co-opting their silence vis-a-vis the abuses which were going 
on. At a certain point, the ethics of  such an operation need to be called into question. 
There is  no  inevitabfe conflict between security and human rights advocacy within the 
context  of humanitarian  crises,  or  between  security  and  access.  Complex  emergency 
situations require agencies and donors to make difficult ~thical judgments, identifying the 
best interests of victims, but such judgments still have to be made. Skirting around them 
by  appealing  to  over-simplified  assumptions  about  humanitarian  action  is  counter-
productive and may put victims' lives in danger. 
5.4  Changing belligerent behaviour 
•  Uphold the identity of humanitarian aid and penalise abuses by belligerents 
In  situations of open conflict, humanitarian operations need to  be clearly delimited and 
identifiable  if the  humanitarian  label  is  to  be  a  source  of security.  Donors  should 
therefore make sure that they adopt a rigorous definition of humanitarian aid under such 
circumstances  and  consistently  differentiate  it  from  other  types  of intervention.  In 
contacts  with  the  parties  in  presence,  they  should  at  all  times  reinforce  the  specific 
identity of  humanitarian aid and project humanitarian standards. 
This does not mean that humanitarian activities should be developed in isolation, or that 
the  definition  which  is  adopted  needs  to  be  extremely  restrictive.  The  need  for  such 
distinctions is also largely confined to open conflict situations. In post-conflict situations 
or  situations  of subdued  violence,  it  may  also  be  highly  artificial  to  draw  rigid 
distinctions between humanitarian aid and other sorts of aid, and it is  not obvious that 
doing so would enhance security much, if  at all, in such situations. 
15 In pursuing both formal  and informal means to  encourage respect and punish abuse of 
humanitarian principles, donors should establish and maintain a common front and make 
their position clear and credible to the parties in presence. Their determination to enforce 
a particular line should be independent of  any other foreign policy considerations short of 
force majeure. As stated, other strands of foreign policy should, however, not be such as 
to  undermine  the · credibility  of dissuasion  and  deterrence  mechanisms  which  donor 
governments have established  . 
.  · Donors should not be  under any illusions as  to  the likely effect of "soft" deterrents to 
abuses of humanitarian principles and human rights in the context of internal conflicts. 
The  dynamics  of such  conflicts  do  not  often  admit  of such  deterrence.  However,  if 
governments are  serious about deterrence they  certainly - except in the  most extreme 
cases - have many tools available which are often underemployed. 
Donor statements and those by UN political organs need to be assessed for their possible 
security implications in the field, and agencies should receive advance notification of  any 
important statements or changes in policy which may impact upon their security. 
•  Be  alert  to  negative  impact  and  usc  other  aid  instruments  to  improve  the 
security environment 
Donors should be aware that over-funding relief at the cost of other aid  activities may 
create disparities, and incentives for greater rather than less violence. 
This  problem  notably  arises  in  the  context  of refugee  crises,  where  over-favourable 
treatment of refugee or displaced populations compared to the standard of living of host 
populations must be avoided. This can only add to tensions which are already present if 
camps  are  a .source  of insecurity  for  local  populations  because  of criminality,  the 
proximity  of arms  and  armed  groups,  or  their  impact  on  the  environment  and  local 
infrastructures.  Addressing this issue implies both programming humanitarian aid with 
more  sensitivity  and  ensuring  counterpart  measures  for ·local  populations  are  also  in 
place. 
General lawlessness and incentives to engage in crime are also sources of insecurity for 
relief workers.  Aid should be  used  to  invest  more  actively  in  measures  that  promote 
livelihood security and alternative employment for civilians and combatants. 
Security  in  a  number  of situations,  particularly  post-conflict  ones,  can  be  directly 
improved by investing,. tbr example, in military reforms, police, judiciary and the media. 
There must also be much greater awareness of  the way in which all manner of traditional 
aid  instmments  may  serve  to  stabilise  the  security  situation  by  removing  sources  of 
friction and encouraging cooperative peace-building - but they must be mobilised more 
rapidly than tends to be the case at present.  , 
The use of mass communications for diffusing awareness of humanitarian principles and 
the  specifics of ongoing operations is  also  a  potentially important tool  of "preventive 
advocacy". 
16 •  Review options for the involvement of the military 
At  the  end  of 1994,  there  were  17  operations  where  ICRC  worked  alongside  UN 
peacekeeping forces, and operations such as those in Bosnia and Albania have provided 
further proof of the role that the military has to play in a number of humanitarian crises. 
In  Eastern Zaire at  the  end of 1996,  an international  military  intervention might have 
made it possible to save many more lives. 
Options for the use of the military need, however, to  be reviewed. In particular, the idea 
of  direct protection to relief supplies and workers must be approached very critically. 
Military operations should always have a military logic and they should be coordinated 
with humanitarian actors at the highest level.  Donors should support efforts to develop 
and  disseminate  civil-military  doctrine  applicable  to  such  operations.  The  'political 
doctrine' of military intervention also needs to  be developed, so that standard response 
tools are available and predictability in  their deployment can be improved.  Rather than 
allow the military to be a "solution in search of  a problem", modular responses in support 
of humanitarian space which stop short of outright intervention need to  be  studied and 
put in place.  Contingency planning,  and joint exercises,  for  such deployments  should 
become standard practice. 
On the EU side, anticipating the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, WEU should 
take the lead in developing such response tools, which fall under the Petersberg tasks, in 
close cooperation with the Commission, Member States, and interested agencies.  · 
5.5  Reducing the material scope for abuse 
•  Insist on projects with a strong reliance on local resources 
Using aid to  strengthen local structures and increase self-sufficiency is  an important aim 
in itself. Donors also need to be aware of the reduction in risk which can be gained from 
implementing projects which co-opt the interests of local populations and rely on their 
knowledge resources. 
Local  resources can be  used  in a creative way for  a  number of logistic tasks,  such  as 
delivery, more safely and with fewer losses and reduced costs. In Somalia, for instance, 
the technique was used of selling relief goods to  local merchants with an agreement to 
buy them back at a premium at destination. Because those goods belonged during transit 
to  private  individuals, they had every  incentive to  ensure their safe  passage,  and  their 
local  knowledge  and  contacts  also  made  it  far  easier  for  them  to  do  so.  This  is  an 
illustration, not a universal model, but it proved to cut losses from  50% down to  under 
10%. Given the negative impact of  diverted aid, such techniques merit serious attention  .  .. 
•  Encourage the formulation of groundrules 
In recent years there have been some experiments with the use of so-called "groundrules" 
for  humanitarian  operations,  of which  the  best-known example  is  Operation  Lifeline 
Sudan. Such groundrules offer many advantages from a security perspective because they 
17 can  provide  for  inter-agency  solidarity,  context-specific  dissemination  and 
implementation  of  humanitarian  principles,  and  predictability  in  cases  of  abuse. 
Depending  on  the  context,  donors  might  also  be  able  to  assist  in  the  process  of 
negotiating such groundrules by lending their weight to implementation arrangements. 
•  Know when to suspend aid or to withdraw 
All  too  often,  withdrawal,  suspension or scaling down of aid  seems to  be a  knee-jerk 
reaction  to  events the  implications of which are  not  really  analysed.  Such use of the 
ultimate sanction '"of withdrawal makes of it a very blunt instrument and,  while easy to 
understand, is difficult to justify. 
The  threat of withdrawal  may  be  a  powerful  one  in  some  circumstances,  whereas  in 
others atrocities are designed to  achieve precisely that and the idea that it  might be an · 
option will only encourage them. The correct reaction at donor level should be the fruit of 
careful analysis. 
Donors have a particular responsibility in decisions of this kind, because they often have 
considerable  influence  on  agency  decisions  on  whether  to  withdraw  or  suspend  aid; 
indeed, this influence is almost total when it comes to renewing funding or allowing new 
operations  to  start  up.  A  coordinated  response  is  of paramount  importance  if the 
instrument of withdrawal is  to  have maximum impact - it is clearly no use at all just to 
replace one agency on the ground by another without reassessing the situation. 
Rather than simply withdraw aid, it makes sense in the first instance to  limit oneself to 
suspending it pending a reassessment of appropriate and available measures to  improve 
the security environment according to the principles laid out in this paper. It may well be 
possible to redesign the approach being followed in such a way as to reduce security risks 
significantly and allow aid to continue. 
Donors may make more mistakes over allowing aid in than withdrawing it. There is often 
a tendency in extreme situations to want to  do something at all costs, but frequently this 
does not  imply willingness to  provide sufficient political or even if necessary military 
backup to  make the operation tenable. This in effect encourages agencies to accept very' 
limited humanitarian space at the cost of their appearing to condone or at least relativise 
massacres and other human rights abuses. The net effect may be precisely the opposite of 
the  one  intended.  In  particular,  donors  have  a  prime  responsibility  in  dissuading  UN 
agencies from getting into a situation where they become a silent party to  abuses, which 
undermines the credibility of  the UN and thereby that of the international community as a 
whole. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Although it  contains a variety of recommendations, this  paper can be  summarised very 
simply. Insecurity is  a factor which may seriously compromise humanitarian operations, 
and it therefore needs to be addressed as a priority and with all available means. 
18 There  is  an  urgent  need  for  more  professional  agency  and  inter-agency  security 
arrangements than exist at present. Agencies also need to  become much more aware of 
the  unintended impact which their way  of working  may have  on the  general  security 
situation in a given theatre. 
Donors  too  need  to  become much more  directly  involved  in  issues of security.  Many 
resources  are  available,  but  there  is rarely,  if ever,  an  integrated security  strategy  for 
humanitarian  operations  and  so  the  potential  to  improve  the  situation  goes  largely 
unexploited. 
No amount of effort is ever likely to make humanitarian operations risk-free: sadly, there 
are  always  likely  to  be  occasional  casualties  amongst  relief staff.  But  the  principal 
concern that this paper sets out to address is not to eliminate risk as  such. It is rather to 
counter the fact that security conditions are making it increasingly difficult to  get aid to 
victims at all. 
The "good news", if one can call it that, is that the risks associated with relief operations 
can be reduced significantly through a judicious combination of measures which may be 
relatively innovatory but are certainly not beyond the international community's grasp. 
By doing so, humanitarian space can be widened and more lives saved. 
19 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
•  Move security issues up the agenda of agencies and donors 
•  Keep the security situation under review 
•  Sponsor further research 
INFLUENCING AGENCY PRACTICE 
•  Encourage good practice and be prepared to fund security 
•  Require a high standard of security from agencies 
•  Require a high standard of professional ethics and standards 
•  Strengthen inter-agency capacity 
•  Review UN arrangements 
•  Support an integrated approach to field security 
NEEDED CHANGES TO DONOR AID AND COOPERATION POLICY 
•  Emphasise conflict prevention and·mitigation 
•  Stick to global principles for donor humanitarian funding 
•  Eliminate incentives to take unnecessary risk 
•  Choose agencies in  function of the situation 
•  Encourage a "focal agency" model for security in the field 
•  Be sensitive to the implications of visibility 
•  Allow agencies flexibility to cope with changing security conditions on the ground 
•  Mobilise non-military support to the security environment 
•  Assume a greater responsibility for aid worker safety 
•  Ensure overall foreign policy is consistent with and supports humanitarian objectives 
•  Uphold an ethic of humanitarianism and establish a partnership with agencies which 
encompasses human rights 
CHANGING BELLIGERENT BEHAVIOUR 
•  Uphold the identity of humanitarian aid and penalise abuses by belligerents 
•  lle alert to negative impact and usc other aid instruments to improve the security 
environment 
•  Review options for the involvement of the military 
REDUCING THE MATERIAL SCOPE FOR ABUSE 
•  Insist on projects with a strong reliance on local resources 
•  Encourage the formulation of groundrules 
•  Know when to suspend aid or to withdraw 
20 